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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

RECENT CASES
MORTGAGE-FORECLOSURE

VERSUS PROCEDURE ON THE BOND

Defendant and her husband owned separately, adjoining tracts of land. They
executed a joint bond to plaintiff company, and as security gave a singIe blanket
mortgage covering both tracts. Subsequently, the husband conveyed his tract to
himself and defendant as tenants by entireties, after which the tract so conveyed
was mortgaged by them jointly to a third party. Then the husband died; and default having occurred on the bond, plaintiff confessed judgment thereon against the
defendant. Plaintiff purchased both tracts at the execution sale, and the judgment
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Co., etc., v. Emmons, 338 Pa. 513, 13 A. (2d) 417 (1940). (Citing Clarke v.
Stanley, 10 Pa. 472 (1849); Ridgway v. Longaker, 18 Pa. 215 (1852) ; Cronister
v Weise, 8 Watts 215 (1839).)
In the practice of law it happens frequently, as in this type of case, that a desired result can be achieved in either of several ways. One will involve a complicated, vexatious procedure; while the alternative may be so simple and direct that
it comes to be adopted almost exclusively.
The above procedure on a bond and mortgage is an outstanding example.
The practice of confessing judgment on the bond and selling the mortgage property in execution (the mortgagee buying it at a nominal price) avoids delay, expense, and labor. The waiting period required in foreclosure proceedings is
averted; the necessity of serving notice on terre-tenants as required -by the line of
statutes to which the Act of April 23, 1903, P. L. 261, is an amendment, is obviated.
Further, the lien of the judgment dates back to the time of recordation of the
mortgage, cutting out the accrued rights of other creditors just as effectively as
would foreclosure proceedings. Morris v. Campbell, 186 Pa. 589, 40 A. 1014
(1898).
So advantageous is this procedure that it has become, in Pennsylvania, almost
the exclusive method for collecting th- mortgage debt by action. The members
of the bar use it as a matter of course and without giving a thought to the possibility that this facile procedure may at times be either less desirable or actually
less effective than the alternative roundabout method.
Occasionally a case arises wherein, as in the instant case, the use of the procedure on the bond fails to protect the client's interests and causes embarrassmeit
to the lawyer who was too willing to follow the line of least resistance. Because
this case shows some of the dangers of a too hasty and unquestioning use of the
procedure on the bond, it should be of interest to all practitioners. It is, if nothing
else, a warning that even this universally accepted practice may, because of unusual
conditions, fail to accomplish the purpose of its existence.
The rules which here hindered plaintiff in his attempt to obtain clear title
were no doubt well known to him. It simply happened that, in his complacent
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acceptance of the conventional, he neglected to consider their operation on the
case at hand.
It is to be hoped that consideration of this plaintiff's plight will be accepted
by other attorneys as a warning. The Emmons case should discourage them from
rushing headlong into similarly embarrassing positions, and to reflect that, for all
its advantages, "proceeding on the bond and ignoring the mortgage" may not be
the preferable method of handling every case.
J. P. M.

TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-NOTICE-OWNER'S

DUTY

TO

EMPLOYEES

OF SUBCONTRACTOR

The owner of a building employed a contractor to repair a wall near which
pipes containing ammonia gas were located. Plaintiffs, workmen employed by
a sub-contractor, were injured when a brick fell on pipes allowing ammonia gas
to -escape. There was evidence to show that the contractor was notified of the danger,
but neither owner nor contractor notified the workmen thereof. Workmen sued
owner of building on theory that he failed to give them notice of the danger. Held,
the owner of the building performs the duty which he owes to the employees by
notifying the contractor of the hidden dangers. "It would be unreasonable to
require warning to tvery sub-contractor and laborer who entered the premises on
the theory that it was appellant's duty to forsee that the contractor would not
perform his duty and so permit the work to be done improperly." Valles v. PeoplesPittsburgh Trust Co., 339 Pa. 33, 13 A. (2d) 19 (1940).
This view is in lint with other Pennsylvania cases which have followed the
rule expressed in White's Supplement to Thompson on Negligence, Sec. 979: "It
is the rule that the owner of property owes to an independent contractor and his
servants at work thereon, the duty of exercising reasonable care to have the premises
in a safe condition for the work, unless the defects responsible for the injury were
known to the contractor." Newingham v. J. C. Blair Co., 232 Pa. 511, 81 A. 556
(1911); Nettis v. General Tire Co., 317 Pa. 204, 177 A. 39 (1935).
There is very little, if any, authority for this view in other jurisdictions. In
Connors-Weyman Steel Co. v. Kilgore, 189 Ala. 643, 66 So. 609 (1914), the
court said by way of dictum that the owner of the premises is liable to the employees
of a contractor if the owner had, or should have had, knowledge of the danger
and the contractor or employees of the contractor had not.
In a recent California case, Hayden v. Paramount Productions, 33 Cal. App.
(2d) 287, 91 Pac. (2d) 231 (1939), the court intimated, as it did in Brown v.
Board of Trustees, 41 Cal. App. 100, 182 Pac. 316 (1919), and in Jacobson v.
Northwestern Pac. R. R. Co., 175 Cal. 468, 166 Pac. 3 (1917), that the responsibility for warning the employee of a sub-contractor of the danger was upon the
subcontractor and not upon the owner of the premises where the danger is obvious
to the sub-contractor. In these cases, however, it may be argued that the reason
the court denied recovery was that the danger was obvious to the plaintiff.
It seems well settled that where the owner of a building knows, or should
reasonably know, of any hidden dangers thereon, h'e is under a duty to warn any
business visitors or invitees, which includes employees of an independent contractor, of such dangers. This duty is imposed upon the own'er by operation of
law. U. S. Cast Iton Pipe Co. v. Sullivan, 3 F. (2d) 794 (1925); Dobbie v.
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Pacific Gas & El. Co., 95 Cal App. 781, 273 Pac. 630 (1929); Samuelson v.
Cleveland Iron Min. Co., 49 Mich. 164, 170, 43 Am. Rep. 456, 13 N.W. 499
(1882); Stevens v.United Gas& El. Co., 73 N.H. 159, 167, 60 A. 848, 70 L.R.A.
119 (1904); Pittsfield Cottonwear Mfg. Co. v. Pittsfield Shoe Co., 71 N.H. 522,
53 A. 807, 60 L.R.A. 116 (1902). See RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §§343, 332.
In Dobbie v. Pacific Gas & El. Co., supra, the court held that where the contractor and foreman know of the danger the owner of the building is still under
a duty to warn employees of the contractor.
in Pittsfield Cottonivear -Mfg. Co. v. Pittsfield Show Co., supra, the court
said, "Where the duty sought to be enforced is one imposed by law upon the defendant, he cannot escape liability by showing that he employed another, over
whom he had no control, to perform it for him." See also RESTATEMENT, TORTS,
§§ 877, 416 (b).
InStevens v. United Gas & El. Co., supra, which is in accord with the Dobbie
case, the court said that a duty imposed by law upon the owner of premises for
the reasonable protection of his invitee (employee of contractor) is not performed
by an attempted delegation of it to a third party (contractor). Here the court
states the proposition that there is no groundon which it could be held that the
owner was absolved of his duty to warn those whom he invited to work upon
the premises even though the contractor had agreed to warn his employees but
failed to do so.
The Pennsylvania courts would seem to answer this question by saying that
there is no fo-eseeability by the owner of the danger to the employees of the contractor after the contractor is aware of the danger. Rugart v. Keebler-Weyl Baking Co., 277 Pa. 408, 121 A. 198 (1923).
D. M. G.

AGENCY-LIABILITY OF PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSON FOR AGENT'S TORT WHILE

ACTING UNDER DIRECTION OF PEACE OFFICER-"SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT"
Defendant's delivery truck, negligently driven by defendant's employee, injured plaintiff in a collision. The driver had left his route, and his work of delivering papers, and was chasing a traffic violator at the command of a policeman
who jumped on the running board and stayed there. Held, verdict properly directed for defendant by trial court. The driver was not within the scope of his
employment by the defendant while chasing the traffic violator. Balinovic v. Eevning Star Newspaper Co., 113 F. (2d) 505 (App. D. C. 1940).
Some cases hold that a driver commandeered, as in the instant case, is an employee of the municipality and can recover compensation for injuries if there is
compensation provided for municipal employees: Monterey County v. Indus. Accident Comm., 199 Cal. 221, 248 Pac. 912, 47 A.L.R. 359 (1926); Mitchell v.
Indus. Accident Comm., 57 Ohio App. 319, 13 N.E. (2d) 736 (1936); Phelps v.
Boone, 62 App. D.C. 308, 67 F. (2d) 574 (1933).
The general rule is that ".

.

. a master is liable for harm caused by the use

of instrumentalities entrusted by him to a servant only if they are used within the
scope of employment.": Rest., Agency §238. It follows from this principle that
if the servant is acting for another he may be outside the scope of his employment,
in which case the other, rather than the master, will be held liable for the servant's
torts:Rest., Agency §227; Harrell v. Atlas Portland Cement, 250 Fed. 83, 162
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C.C.A. 255 (1918); Burgess v. Standard Oil Co., 262 Fed. 767 (1920); lsaacs v.
Prince, 133 Miss. 205, 97 So. 558 (1923); Carr v. Burke, 183 App. Div. 361, 169
NY. Supp. 981 (1918). For a more comprehensive discussion of this particular
problem, see Atkins, Liability of a Master for a Loaned Ser:.'anl (1933) 37 DICK L.
REV. 267.
However, the principal case involves a problem quite different than do the
cases cited above. There the problem is simply one of deciding which of two
masters should be held liable; i. e., whether in the particular case the servant was
acting for A or for B. This case differs thus: while a municipality may for certain
purposes be a business organization and subject to the same liabilities as other
businesses, here the servant was not working for the municipality, but committed a
tort in the performance of a duty owed to the public and the community generally.
That such a duty exists is well established. A citizen commandeered to pursue a
criminal must serve even though the chase involves grave personal danger: Dougherty v. State, 106 Ala. 63, 17 So. 393 (1895). A police officer is to some extent
immune from civil liability for acts necessary to the performance of his duties.
This immunity is extended to the commandeered driver, but is further limited by
requiring that the driver 'exercise due care. He will be liable to pedestrians for
injuries caused by his negligence in performance of the duty: Schluroff ). Shore
Line Motor Coach Co., 269 Il1. App. 569 (1933); and to a social guest in the
car: Jones v. Melvin, 293 Mass. 9, 199 N.E. 392 (1936).

Since the tort in the instant case was committed while the servant was acting
at the command of an officer, in the performance of a duty owed to the public,
can it be said that he was working for the constituted municipality and thErefore
outside the scope of his -employment? The majority cites and discusses as the
principal authority for its holding Denton v. Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R., 284 US.
305, 52 S. Ct. 141, 76 L. Ed. 310 (1932) (Porter employed by the defendant
railroad was engaged in loading United States mail into a mail car at the direction
of a postal clerk. Held, the railroad was not liable to third persons for injuries
caused by the porter). In a vigorous dissenting opinion Justice Rutledge flails
the decision of the majority and considers the Denion case not in point. He says
that the relationship, and the extent of the railroad's liability, was defined by the
contract with the U. S. government. No contract was mentioned in the report
of the Denton case (unless postal regulations constitute a "contract"), but the
reasoning of the dissenter strikes to the core of the problem and suggests the distinction noted above: Denton v. Yazoo was a case of performance by the tortfeasor
of a mere manual act assisting the government as another business agency, and did
not involve-as does ths case-the question of a duty owed the public to assist
in the apprehension of a misdemeanant.
Following closely upon the suggestion that a duty is owed to the public comes
the question, by whom is the duty owed? The answer to this question is found
in a New York case similar to the principal case, the majority opinion of which
was written by Mr. Justice Cardozo: Babington v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 250 N.Y.
14, 164 N.E. 726, 61 A.L.R. 1354 (1928).
(Police officer jumped on runnin board of cab and ordered driver to pursue another car. Driver of cab killed in
pursuit. Held, driver's widow recovers against cab company under compensation
laws). Cardoza says, "As in the days of Edward I the citizenry may be called
upon to enforce the justice of the state. . . with whatever implements and facilities are convenient and at hand. The incorporeal being, the corporation, would
have been bound to respond in that spirit to the summons of the officer if it had
been sitting in the driver's seat." The majority opinion had dismissed the Bab-
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ington case upon the rather shallow grounds that "the cab.., was subject to call
for any lawful journey. Moreover, the limits of workmen's compensation and of
toit liability are not necessarily identical": Balenovic v, Evening Star Newspaper
Co., 113 F. (2d) 505, 507. Justice Rutledge counters this argument in his dissent
in that case thus (113 F. (2d)

505, 510):

"The burden imposed upon industry therefore cannot be heavy and
certainly is not greater than that imposed by allowing compensation
for injuries sustained in identical circumstances by the employee."
Although the dissenter has based his argument for liability partially upon the
"burden imposed upon industry" as not being very heavy, nevertheless it appears
that his reasoning is well founded. The RESTATEMENT lists and discusses many
tests for determining whether a servant is acting within the scope of his employment, then obviates the difficulties of applying such yardstick tests thus (REST.,
AGENCY §229, comment a):

"Since the phrase 'scope of the employment' is used for the purpose
of determining the liability of the master for the conduct of servants,
the ultimate question is whether or not it is just that the loss resulting
from the servant's acts should be considered as one of the normal risks
to be borne by the business in which the servant is employed."
In short, the term "scope of the employment" has meaning only insofar as it describes a legal result; it is no transcendent, omnipresent, divine principle by which
the decisions of the judges must be governed. Rather, it is only the opinions of
the judges upon the facts of each case which in the end give the expression any
meaning. What the dissenter would have it mean, and in considering the RESTATEMENT comment thereon we think the better meaning, is that in this particular case the dcfendant should be held liable. It seems that the decision wished
by the dissenter would have greater equities than the decision reached by the
majority,
N. R. B.

BOND AND MORTGAGE-DISTINCTION BETWEEN COVENANT

AND

CONDITION

The provisions of a bond and mortgage required, inter alia, that the obligormortgagor, "produce receipts for all taxes and water rents of the current year
assessed upon the premises described in the mortgage." The mortgagor then
conveyed the property, subject to the mortgage, to the defendant company. Before the mortgage became due, the defendant and the mortgagee entered into
an extension agreement whereby it was agreed that the defendant, "does not
assume payment of any of the items required to be paid by the obligor under the
said bond and by the mortgagor under the said mortgage," and the mortgagee
agreed that, "upon default in the payment of any item of principal or interest or
any other item required to be paid under the said bond and mortgage . .. (he)

shall look solely to the obligor nam'ed in the bond. . . and to the premises upon
which said mortgage is. . . a lien for the payment of any items of principal or
interest and other charges and payments which may become payable under the
terms of the said bond and mortgage." While defendant was the registered owner
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of the property in question the taxes for four years were unpaid. Plaintiff, the
present owner as a result of a foreclosure on the mortgage, now sues to recover
the unpaid taxes. Held, defendant is liable for the amount of the unpaid taxes.
Germantown Trust Co. v. Stanley Co. of America, 338 Pa. 533, 13 A. (2d) 406
(1940 .

I
principle of this case is not new or startling. It is merely the court's
most recent reiteration of an often repeated rule of law as to the difference between
a covenant and a condition. The difference between the two is essential both in
regard to the language which constitutes each and in the legal consequences which
flow from a breach. In the matter of language, the law has appropriated no
particular form of words for the creation of a covenant or a condition. Whatever
shows the intent of the parties to bind themselves to a performance of the thing
stipulated, may be deemed a covenant, without regard to the form of expression
used. Campbell v. Shrum, 3 Watts 60 (1834); Taylor v. Preston, 79 Pa. 436
(1875); Green v. Green, 225 Pa. 224, 99 A. 801 (1916).
And our courts
fully recognize the contrasting legal results flowing from a breach of each. Where
the language imports a condition merely, and there are no words importing an
agreement, it cannot be enforced as a covenant, but the only remedy is through
a forfeiture of the estate. Sharon Iron Co. v. City of Erie, 31 Pa. 341 (1861).
However, despite the fact that the average attorney is fully familiar with tht
theoretical distinction between a covenant and a condition and the contrasting results evolving therefrom, there are cases continually in litigation because many
lawyers refuse to be mindful of these differences when they set about the task
of drafting an instrument of legal consequence.
In the instant case, it was the contention of the defendant that the obligormortgagor by the provision, "to produce receipts for taxes," thereby agreed to pay
the taxes on the property, and that, as a result of this promise and the provisions
of the subsequent extension agreement, it was relieved of any obligation in the
matter of taxes.
However, the court refused to sustain this contention and concluded that nowhere in the instrument is there a promise or covenant on the part of the mortgagor to pay the taxes on the property, or any provision referring to such a promise
or covenant. The only covenant is contained in the bond, where the mortgagor
"binds and obliges" himself to the payment of the penal sum of the bond. The
condition of the bond is that if the principal or interest of the mortgage is paid,
or if the receipts for taxes produced, the obligation shall be void; ot erwise to
remain in full force and virtue. Such a condition does not, however, amount to
a covenant to produce the tax receipts. Just as in the case of a mortgage unaccompanied by a bond the mortgagee must look only to the land for payment and
has no personal right against the mortgagor, notwithstanding the condition in the
mortgage has been broken or not complied with: Scott v. Fields, 7 Watts 360
(1838); Baum v. Tonkin, 110 Pa. 569, 1 A. 535 (1885); Nace's Est., 52 Pa.
Super. Ct. 607 (1913); Reap v. Battle, 155 Pa. 265, 26 A. 439 (1893); Schweyer
v. Walbert, 190 Pa. 334, 42 A. 694 (1899); Gill's Est., 268 Pa. 500, 112 A. 80
(1920). The condition requiring production of the tax receipts did not amount to
a promise to pay the taxes, and, therefore, the taxes were not one of the charges and
pyments which might become payable under the terms of the bond and mortgage.
The duty to pay taxes arose from the obligor-mortgagor's ownership of the property. The duty passed to the defendant company as the new owner. For breach
of this duty it is now held liable.

J. M. Q.

